|
Mujahid
Dokubo-Asari was born Dokubo Melford Goodhead Junior to a middle
class, Christian family in Buguma, Rivers State on June 1, 1964
(Vanguard [Port Harcourt], June 23). The son of a high court judge,
Asari attended both primary and secondary school in the Rivers State
capital of Port Harcourt, before studying law at the University of
Calabar in Cross-Rivers State (BBC News, October 4, 2004). In his
third year in 1990, however, he dropped out of the university due to
tensions with the administration. After leaving the University of
Calabar, Asari resumed his law studies at the Rivers State
University of Science and Technology, yet he again dropped out for
similar reasons (BBC News, October 4, 2004). It is not clear exactly
when he converted to Islam, but most sources state that it occurred
shortly before he left the University of Calabar, between 1988-1990.
His decision to convert to Islam was a result of his growing
political and social activism (Business Day Africa [Johannesburg] ,
October 8, 2004). Asari explained that he found Islam to be a
religion that helped him in his "agitation, because Islam accepts my
role as somebody who should correct the ills of society and the
fight against oppression even with my life" (allAfrica.com, July 29,
2005). Nevertheless, Asari has said that Islam does not have a role
in the delta conflict because Muslims make up less than one percent
of the Ijaw population (allAfrica.com, July 29, 2005) [1].
During the early
1990s, Asari traveled to Libya, along with a host of other
countries, where he claimed to have received military and political
training [2]. For the rest of the decade, he spent much of his time
contesting elections. In 1992, Asari ran an unsuccessful election
campaign for a seat in the Rivers State House of Assembly (Daily
Independent [Lagos], June 21). In 1998, he tried to become the
chairman of the Asari-Toru Local Government Area of Rivers State,
yet again failed in his bid (Daily Independent, June 21). After
these failed attempts, Asari joined the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), a
coalition of Ijaw youth groups and a key foundational block to the
current violence in the delta.
The Ijaw Youth Council
Asari was
involved in founding the IYC in 1998, and he became the
organization' s first vice president. The IYC was largely led by
university-educated activists, and in December 1998 it released the
famous Kaiama Declaration, which demanded control of the delta's
energy resources [3]. The declaration soon stirred the entire Ijaw
population, and more than 500 Ijaw communities supported it [4]. In
2001, Asari became president of the IYC. The factors surrounding his
promotion are clouded, as it is alleged that the Rivers State
governor at the time, Peter Odili, helped Asari secure the position
(Daily Independent, June 21). Odili's motive was to split the IYC's
leadership, which was led by Felix Tuodolo, in order to weaken the
organization since he saw it as a threat to his power in Rivers
State. Odili's assistance in securing him the leadership role in the
IYC explains why Asari allegedly helped Odili's reelection campaign
in Rivers State. Various reports maintain that Asari engaged in
voter fraud on behalf of Odili and also intimidated the voting
public and rival politicians [5]. Odili apparently compensated Asari
by overlooking his energy theft activities.
During this
period, however, Asari grew increasingly militant. His more radical
agenda was at odds with the core leadership of the IYC, which led
him to begin building a private militia organization that became
known as the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) (Business
Day Africa, October 8, 2004). Furthermore, after the 2003 elections,
Asari rebuked Odili publicly, and reportedly ran an advertisement in
Port Harcourt's newspapers accusing Odili of election fraud and of
arming rival gangs against each other [6].
The Niger Delta
People's Volunteer Force
Asari named the
NDPVF after the 1960s-era Ijaw revolutionary Isaac Boro's Niger
Delta Volunteer Force. He calls Boro his "role model" and has
"decided to walk the path he has thronged" (The Beam News [Port
Harcourt], May 30-June 4). It is not known when exactly the NDPVF
was created, as Asari himself has said that the "date of the
founding of the organization cannot be precise," yet the general
time frame is in late 2003. For Asari, the creation of the NDPVF was
an effort to achieve through force the demands issued in the Kaiama
Declaration.
In order to fund
the operations of the NDPVF, Asari and his men siphoned oil and gas
from pipelines in the delta—an act that is locally known as
"bunkering." Asari justified energy theft on the grounds that the
resources belong to the people of the delta, rather than the federal
government. "The people who own the oil have a right to take the oil
which has been stolen from them by a small clique in Abuja for the
advancement and betterment of that clique that siphons this money to
foreign bank accounts in Europe and the United States and the
Caribbean," he explained. As a result of this reality, Asari says,
it is incorrect to label oil bunkering as theft since "the oil
belongs to us. We're not stealing it. It is the Nigerian state
stealing our oil from us" (IRIN, July 16, 2004).
Oil and gas
bunkering remained the critical component behind Asari's and the
NDPVF's acquisition of sophisticated arms to conduct their
operations. Money earned through selling oil and gas on the black
market was used to purchase arms from local and international arms
dealers. In Nigeria, arms can be easily acquired through various
domestic means, such as from Nigerian soldiers returning from
peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, or from criminal
syndicates in the delta. Furthermore, arms can be acquired on the
high seas during bunkering transactions. Shipping captains, for
instance, often pay armed groups with arms and ammunition in
exchange for stolen oil (Daily Trust [Abuja], May 7). Asari
explained the ease with which his group acquired arms in 2004: "We
are very close to international waters, and it's very easy to get
weapons from ships" (IRIN, July 16, 2004). During 2004 and 2005,
Asari and his men were regularly seen with Kalashnikovs and
rocket-propelled grenades, cruising through the rivers and creeks of
the delta in an armada of speed-boats with powerful outboard motors
(IRIN, July 16, 2004).
Like most of the
political-militant groups in the delta, the NDPVF drew its ranks
from disaffected youth, and brought under its umbrella various youth
confraternities, also known as cult groups. In late 2004, senior
NDPVF members explained the process of how small confraternities and
gangs would operate under the NDPVF's banner, keeping their separate
leadership structures intact, yet surrendering command-and- control
to the NDPVF. At its height, the NDPVF attacked energy
infrastructure, rival gangs and siphoned oil and gas from pipelines.
Odili and the
government were threatened by Asari's creation of the NDPVF. By
September 2004, the NDPVF had announced an "all-out war" against the
Nigerian state, turning the former collaborators into enemies. In
addition to directing the Nigerian security services at the NDPVF,
Odili allegedly employed another delta militant, Ateke Tom, to use
his private militia as part of the fight. Ateke Tom created the
Niger Delta Vigilantes—which largely drew men from his cult gang
known as the Icelanders (German)—and waged war against Asari's NDPVF.
The two groups fought over territory and access to lucrative energy
bunkering routes.
By late 2004,
instability in the delta was rising rapidly, and, at the end of
September, Asari's NDPVF issued an ultimatum to multinational energy
companies to shut down their operations by October 1, otherwise
their employees would become targets in a major guerrilla operation
called Operation Locust Feast (IRIN, October 4, 2004). The
announcement sparked panic among energy companies and caused the
price of oil to shoot to a new record of $50 per barrel. As a
result, the government of Olusegun Obasanjo was forced to recognize
Asari's influence in the delta by inviting him and his rival, Ateke
Tom, to Abuja in order to reach an agreement on the cessation of
hostilities. A deal was reached on October 1 that was supposed to
lead to the disbanding of their respective militia groups and their
total disarmament as well as to keep them within the democratic
process (Business Day Africa, October 8, 2004). Although some of the
deal was implemented, it soon fell apart.
On September 20,
2005, Nigerian authorities arrested Asari on charges of treason and
imprisoned him at the federal security services headquarters in
Abuja. His arrest came after he issued persistent separatist
rhetoric. Throughout his detention, Asari was rebellious, especially
in public venues, such as during his various court hearings. In
early 2007, for example, Asari threatened to kill Federal High Court
Judge Peter Olayiwola (Daily Trust, February 13; Rhythm FM [Abuja],
March 6). Furthermore, in the wake of his detention, violence in the
delta actually escalated. It appears that the NDPVF fractured, and
former fighters conducted attacks in the name of the Movement for
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and other armed groups.
There also appears to have been a rise in criminality, and the
political ideology that previously characterized the struggle lost
its prominence.
Asari's New Role
in the Delta
On June 14,
2007, Asari was released from prison under the pretext of his
deteriorating health from hypertension and diabetes (Agence France-Presse,
June 14). Since his release, Asari has persisted in delivering harsh
rhetoric against the Nigerian government. He has called for the
arrest of former President Olusegun Obasanjo, vowing that he "will
not rest the struggle until Obasanjo is brought to book. He has
committed crimes against humanity" (Oyibosonline. com, July 19).
Furthermore, he has argued that the Nigerian constitution will one
day "surely crumble" (Vanguard, June 23). Nevertheless, he appears
to have moderated his stance, and he has, at least publicly,
disavowed the use of violence—which was likely the main condition
for his release. Shortly after his release, for instance, Asari
said, "I will not use any means that would be criminal…but I want to
assure you that I will never give up this struggle" (Daily
Independent, June 21).
He has also
spoken out against the rise of criminality in the region that
appears to be taking place outside the control of the more
established political-militant groups. Upon his release, Asari
stated, "We would try and work together to stop this act of
brutality and banditry…something that we are not. We are fighting
for justice; we should not do injustice to other people" (Daily
Independent, June 21). Speaking specifically on the various
kidnap-for-ransom schemes in the delta, Asari said that
"hostage-taking is evil. It has brought easy wealth, laziness,
criminality in our midst. It has destroyed the moral fabric of the
Ijaw man" (Vanguard, June 23). He claims that the Ijaw have turned
their "noble" struggle into "a conduit pipe leading to easy money"
and valuable lives have been wasted "for the sole purpose of
satisfying our insatiable greed" (Daily Champion, May 28). It is
possible that some criminal gangs are concerned that Asari's return
to the scene will pressure them to limit their more abusive—yet
lucrative—activities , and resist conducting operations that
discredit Ijaw grievances (Vanguard, June 23).
Furthermore,
Asari has expressed tentative approval over the role of Goodluck
Jonathan, Nigeria's new Ijaw vice president. "I am 100 percent in
support of him if his activities will be in the interest of the Ijaw
and Niger Delta people," Asari explained. "As I came out [from
prison], I found out that Jonathan has overwhelming support among
Ijaw people…Then who am I if I say I am an Ijaw leader to go against
him? My own personal opinion in this issue does not matter"
(Vanguard, June 23). Most recently, Asari has acted as an
intermediary between the delta's underground political movement and
the government. On July 20, for example, delta militants offered a
cease-fire in exchange for a series of demands (Vanguard, July 20).
Those terms were conveyed by Asari to President Umaru Yar'Adua in
Abuja. It is clear that Asari is hoping to preserve his role as a
key ideological leader among the Ijaw and other delta inhabitants.
The terms of his release preclude Asari from resuming his past
militant activities, yet he maintains extensive contacts with delta
militant groups, making him an asset to both the government and to
the armed fighters. Since many of his former followers in the NDPVF
are probably now operating under other armed factions, Asari's reach
extends deep into the dizzying network of groups and sub-groups in
the Niger Delta.
Despite some
controversial statements, Asari has not tried to integrate Islam
into the Niger Delta struggle. For instance, in an interview with
allAfrica.com on July 29, 2005, Asari explained: "There's no room
for implementation of Sharia in the Niger Delta because among the
Ijaws, the Muslims are less than one percent and they do not have
political control of the Ijaw people…As far as this land is
concerned, Ijaw is not by rule Islamic…the issue of Sharia does not
arise in Ijaw land." When asked whether the NDPVF shared the same
ideology as Osama bin Laden, Asari replied: "Definitely not! My
group is 99 percent made up of people who are not Muslims."
According to Asari, the "killing of innocent, unharmed people" is
not part of Ijaw beliefs and "no Ijaw man will commit 9/11."
|